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ABSTRACT
Stealthiness can be described as a disposition to be sly and
to do things surreptitiously. This paper presents a new architecture for flexible and secure networking in battlefields
that enables stealthy and covert communication in the
presence of node mobility. Our architecture is based on
the combination of optical (fiber) and wireless links. Our
objective is to be able to carry on undeterred communication without the attack/eavesdropping nodes being able to
detect the presence of any communication. This objective
is not only crucial for successful completion of the operation, but also for the safety of our mobile nodes, by not
giving out their locations.
We combine the advantages of optical links, such as high
bandwidth, low delays, low error rates, good security, with
the advantages of wireless links, such as mobility and flexibility, along with directional antennas for communication.
From security point of view, we also assume presence of
red zones, which are the ones controlled by the adversary
or where the adversary can trace wireless activities.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications offer an attractive option for
many military, commercial as well as personal communication needs because of flexibility, cost effectiveness, and
mobility support. However, for several security reasons,
the devices prefer to minimize communication wirelessly.
For example, wireless communication is more susceptible
to jamming attacks and also might leak critical information
such as location of communicating nodes. Even if strong
encryption techniques could be used to hide this information, it is infeasible to hide the location of the transmitting
nodes. Thus, the broadcast nature of these wireless networks might jeopardize the lives of the mobile nodes and
even the objective of the mission, since any enemy/eavesdropping node can detect ongoing communication and could sense the presence of troops. The eavesdropping nodes might even be able to compute the
978-1-4244-2677-5/08/$25.00 ©2008 IEEE

locations of the communicating nodes and thus endanger
their lives.
On the other hand, optical networks can offer high transmission rates that can accommodate broadband needs,
provide error-free transmissions and most importantly they
are immune to eavesdropping and jamming attacks. But,
they do not provide the flexibility and mobility support
that wireless networks offer.
Often, one might not be able to control the extent of optical coverage in a given network area. This challenge arises
because most of the times, one might be utilizing the existing optical links. Deploying new optical links might not be
feasible for practical reasons; cost issues; the mission
might be temporary, the need might be immediate and
there might not be enough time to deploy a complete optical network.
This paper presents a new architecture for flexible and secure networking in battlefields for enabling covert communication. Our architecture is based on the combination
of optical and wireless links. This advantage of fiber optical links was demonstrated during recent conflicts in the
Middle East.
Our objective is to be able to carry on undeterred communication without the attack/eavesdropping nodes being able
to detect the presence of any communication. To quantify
this, we define a new metric in this paper called stealthiness – that is the probability that an on-going communication among benign nodes in the network cannot be detected by the adversary.
We propose hybrid network architecture and a new Stealthy Routing Protocol (SRP) to exploit the optical links.
The proposed routing protocol intelligently selects appropriate routes to maximize stealthiness and minimize the
probability of the communication being detected by any
malicious nodes present in the network. Our architecture
also considers communication via directional antennas,
which are available today in numerous forms and sophistications. Further, we assume both passive and active malicious adversaries; a passive adversary can only detect and
perceive ongoing communication, while an active adver-
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sary can compromise a node and use the node to actively
participate in routing or other network operations. Through
extensive simulation and analysis, we show that exploiting
optical links, along with directional antenna based wireless
communication could drastically improve the stealthiness
of the network.
From security point of view, we assume presence of red
zones, which are the ones controlled by the adversary or
where the adversary can trace wireless activities. It is crucial that communication range and routes be selected so as
to not to overlap these regions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: we first
present related work with respect to both wireless networks and optical networks. Then, we present our network
architecture. We then present and analyze the proposed
Stealthy Routing Protocol and finally, we conclude the
paper with some final remarks.

Previous research on data communication has not exploited hybrid device capabilities for security purposes.
They either consider pure wireless networks or optical
networks to evaluate security. Our novel architecture, described next, is tailored to deal with the unique constraints
and event dynamics of military networks and achieve covert communications without degradation in network connectivity or performance.
NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
We assume a hybrid network which consists of both optical links and wireless links as shown in Figure 1. We specify the different components of the network as follows:
−

Optical links with the end points equipped with a transceiver and we denote them as Access Points (APs);
the optical links can offer high transmission rates that
can accommodate broadband needs and provide errorfree transmissions. However, APs are fixed and hence
are immobile. APs are assumed to form an interconnected (backbone) with each other via optical
links.

−

Wireless mobile nodes equipped with power controlled steered directional antenna systems; we assume
that the wireless mobile nodes are equipped with GPS
or similar devices and thus, are aware of their location
with reasonable accuracy. Because of mission oriented
nature of these networks, we think this is a reasonable
assumption.

−

Red zones consisting of enemy nodes whose objective
is to track and observe the actions/movement of mobile wireless nodes; their objective might be more intense and might involve actions like jamming and destroy. Thus, the objective of the communication
protocol is to carry on communication without being
detected. Note that those zones that are suspected of
being under surveillance by an enemy agent are the red
zones. It is also possible that some other un-suspected
zones can also be ‘un-known’ red zones if they are under surveillance by an adversary.

RELATED WORK
Over the past few years, research into ad hoc networks has
yielded considerable advances, notably in the areas of new
routing and medium access techniques. Wireless communication networks have also been deployed in disasters and
are currently considered the most reliable and flexible
communications means for disastrous events, owing to
their flexibility and mobility support [1,2].
Directional antennas offer tremendous potential for improving the performance of ad hoc networks. Directional
antennas have a number of advantages over omnidirectional antennas in ad hoc networking. By focusing energy
only in the intended direction, directional antennas can
increase the potential for spatial reuse and can provide
longer transmission and reception ranges for the same
amount of power. A number of protocols for wireless ad
hoc networks with directional antennas have been proposed and studied. For instance see [3,4,5,6], where the
approximate directional antenna pattern is considered as a
circular sector with radius r and angle θ. Therefore, the
area where the transmission could be detected is:
A ( r,θ ) =

θ
2

r2

Optical networking, with its almost unlimited bandwidth,
is also attractive for several other reasons - most important
being they are immune to eavesdropping and jamming attacks. Several works have tried to combine wireless and
optical networking technologies especially to solve the
"last mile problem" [7, 8, 9, 10] but not for security reasons.

STEALTHY ROUTING PROTOCOL
In this section we present the architecture for enabling undeterred and undetectable communication among the
nodes. The complete protocol is described below.
1. Network Setup
Each wireless mobile node (MN) in the network is given
the information regarding every Access Point in the network. The information most importantly includes the Public Key of the AP and the location of the AP. Since the
number of APs is assumed to be limited and as the information is not dynamic, this imposes negligible bandwidth /
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communication overhead. Further, each AP is provided the
access to the Public Keys of all the mobile nodes (PKN-i).
Well known authentication schemes based on asymmetric
encryption can be used to protect the network against active attacks like false message injection, selective dropping, sybil, breaking confidentiality etc.
2. Network Updates
Every MN in the network periodically sends an update
regarding its location to the nearest AP. If a MN is
aware of its destination or the path/direction it is going
to further move on, the MN includes this information
in the update1.

sage implosion at the APs. Moreover, the period intervals
could be constant for all the MNs or they might be different. If they are different, the interval would be dependant
not only on the speed of the MN but also other factors such
as importance of the mission, security level of the region
and others. For simplicity, in this paper, we assume a constant period interval for all nodes.
3. Routing Decision: One-hop or Multiple Hops
Whenever a MN has to communicate to an AP or vice versa, a decision has to be made whether the MN (or the AP)
has to send the packet directly to the AP (or the MN) or
use intermediate nodes to relay the packet. In the presence
of directional transmission, relaying the packet through
intermediate node not only saves power but also, more
importantly, decreases the probability of being detected.
Whenever a wireless MN is involved in communication,
an AP chooses a route so as to minimize the detection
probability. This routing problem could be easily solved
similar to shortest path problem – construct a graph with
the cost of the edge between to wireless nodes set to
square the distance between them and then, compute the
route with the shortest cost (since the probability of being
detected depends on the area of transmission). It could be
easily proven that this is the optimal path to minimize the
detection probability.
4. Stealthy Communication

Figure 1: The network consists of wireless mobile nodes and
Access Points for them to communicate via optical links. Some
enemy nodes might be present in the network.

Since, the MN knows its own location, it could compute
the nearest AP from the list it maintains and then could
compute the direction and transmission power level
needed to reach the AP. Thus, by transmitting with just
enough energy and in only one direction, the MN can minimize the probability of being detected by enemy nodes.

We categorize the communication between the nodes into
four categories. Here, we describe each category and explain the routing process for each. For all kinds of communication, the messages carry a Message Authentication
Code (MAC) so that the destination can verify that the
message was indeed sent by the sender and the messages
are encrypted using the destination’s public key so that
only the destination can read the message thus preserving
the secrecy.

Each AP periodically aggregates the location information
of all the nodes to which it is the nearest AP and distributes the information to the rest of the APs. Since, optical
links offer high bandwidths, these updates would not affect
the performance of the network.
Further, to avoid all MNs from sending update messages
simultaneously, the period start times are randomly assigned to each MN. This would alleviate the update mes1

Since, we consider a mission oriented scenario, we assume the MNs
often know where they are going and hence, this information might be
exploited for routing purposes.

a. AP-to-AP: Since these messages are from one AP to
another, these could be completely routed across optical links and hence are very secure and undetectable
by enemy nodes.
b. MN-to-AP: In this scenario, a MN sends a packet to
an AP. For this purpose, the MN computes the nearest AP based on its location and the location table of
the APs; then it transmits the message to the nearest
AP. In scenarios, where multiple packets has to be
sent by the MN, the AP computes the optimal path
that minimizes the probability of transmission detection (as described in previous section) and sends this
information to the MN. The MN then uses this path
for further communication.
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c. AP-to-MN: This scenario is similar to the above scenario. The AP first computes the optimal path and establishes a path to the MN through that path and further communication takes place through this path.
d. MN-to-MN: This scenario could further be divided
into two scenarios
-

-

The simplest scenario is when the MNs have different APs as their nearest APs. Then, the nearest
APs first establish optimal paths between themselves and the corresponding MNs and then MNs
communicate through the APs. This scenario
could be seen as a combination of above two scenarios.
Both MNs have same AP as their nearest AP. In
this scenario, the AP first computes the optimal
path between the MNs and forwards this information to the MNs. Then the MNs establish a path
via this path and initiate communication along this
path.

5. Routing in presence of Red Zones
In hostile scenarios, one can envision presence of enemy
troops in some areas inside the network coverage area, as
shown in Figure 1. The routing protocol has to ensure that
the locations of transmitting nodes are not disclosed to the
enemy.
Our Stealthy Routing Protocol (SRP) chooses routes
around these Red Zones so as to minimize the probability
of detection. Once any information regarding a Red Zone
is collected at an AP, the AP first broadcasts this information to all other APs. Then, each AP communicates this
information to each MN through direct communication.

Figure 2. Area of overlap for computing the probability of
detection
1. Stealthiness of a omnidirectional wireless path
Assuming omnidirectional propagation, we compute the
stealthiness of a transmission in presence of an adversary.
Initially, assume the presence of only one enemy node that
can be arbitrarily located in the network and whose location is not known. If A is the whole network area, then the
probability of a transmission being detected (PD) could be
approximated as follows:

PD =

Now consider a two-hop communication between nodes X
and Z through an intermediate node Y, see Figure 2. Ac is
the area covered by one transmission. However, when two
neighboring nodes transmit, to compute the area covered
by both transmissions need to be considered. Thus, for this
scenario, the probability that the communication between
X and Z is overheard is

Ac − AX −Y ⎞
Ac ⎞⎛
⎛
PDX − Z = 1 − ⎜1 −
⎟
⎟⎜1 −
A ⎠⎝
A
⎝
⎠
The first term in the compound term in the RHS is the
probability that the transmission by node X is not detected
and the second corresponds to the conditional probability
that the probability by Y is not detected given that transmission by X is not detected.
To generalize, the probability that a communication along
a h-hop path is detected in presence of α adversary nodes
can be computed as follows:
α
Ac − Aavg _ overlap
Ac ⎞ ⎛
⎛
P = 1 − ⎜1 −
⎟ ⎜⎜1 −
A⎠ ⎝
A
⎝

ANALYZING THE STEALTHINESS
In this section, we illustrate the performance analysis of
the proposed SRP for a simple network with omnidirectional wireless radiation patterns. For simplicity we assume a square network of length L. The analysis presented
can be easily extended to other networks. Further, for simplicity, where required, we use first order approximations.

Ac
A

h
D

⎞
⎟⎟
⎠

( h −1)*α

(1)

Finally, given the distance between two neighbor nodes is
d and the transmission range is R, the area of overlap can
be computed as

⎛ d ⎞ d
Aoverlap = 2 R 2 ⎜
⎟−
⎝ 2R ⎠ 2

(2 R − d )(2 R + d )

The stealthiness is the probability of communication being
undetected and can simply be computed as

S = 1 − PDh
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(2)

d N1 −{ AP}

⎧
⎪
= min ⎨
⎪
⎩

( N1x − AP1x ) + ( N1 y − AP1 y )
2

2

( N1x − AP2 x ) + ( N1 y − AP2 y )
2

2

Now, the wireless path length in a hybrid network can be
computed as

⎧⎪d N −{ AP} + d N 2 −{ AP}
d h ( N1 , N 2 ) = min ⎨ 1
⎪⎩d N1 − N 2
The average distance can now be computed as follows:

Figure 3. Choosing a path: pure wireless or hybrid?

1 1 1 1

2. Stealthiness of a wireless network

1 1 1 1

d = ∫∫∫∫

( x1 − y1 ) + ( x2 − y2 ) dx1dx2 dy1dy2
2

2

0 0 0 0

i.e., d =

(

)

1 ⎡
2 + 2 + 5 ln 1 + 2 ⎤ ≈ 0.5214
⎦
15 ⎣

(3)

For a square network of length L, the distance can be computed by simply scaling the above number i.e., the average
distance is 0.5214*L.
The average number of hops for a path (h) between a
source-destination pair can be derived from the Euclidean
distance (d) between the two nodes [12]. For lack of space,
we do not repeat the results and we refer the interested
reader to [12]. Thus, using Equations (1), (2) and (3), one
can compute the stealthiness of a wireless path.

0 0 0 0

(4)
The above equation is derived assuming a unit square. For
a length of L, the distance has to be scaled accordingly.
Using equations (1), (2) and (4), one can compute the
stealthiness of a path in a hybrid optical-wireless network.
Figure 4 presents the numerical data for the above analysis
for the network scenario shown in Figure 3. We consider a
square network of length 1000m with a transmission range
of 100m. We note that as network density increases, the
stealthiness increases as the length of the paths decrease.
Furthermore, as the number of adversary nodes (α) increases, the performance deteriorates for both wireless and
hybrid cases. Hybrid cases performs better (by around
10% for α=5). However, because of omnidirectional
transmissions, even a small number of adversary nodes can
do significant damage.
1

Stealthiness

Consider a square network of length L. Average distance
between a random source-destination pair could be considered to be equivalent to the average distance (d) between
two points randomly selected within a square of length L.
The average distance between two points picked at random
from the interior of a unit square is the n = 2 case of
hypercube line picking [11], i.e.,

E ⎡⎣ d h ( N1 , N 2 ) ⎤⎦ = ∫ ∫ ∫ ∫ d h ( N1 , N 2 ) dN1x dN 2 x dN1 y dN 2 y

3. Stealthiness of a hybrid network
Consider a network a shown in Figure 3. A node chooses a
path that maximizes the stealthiness. In other words, the
smaller the number of wireless hops, the larger the stealthiness. Thus, for source-destination pair N1-N2, the choice
is between a pure wireless path N1-N2 or a hybrid path N1AP1-AP2-N2 (assuming AP1 is closer to N1 than AP2 and
AP2 is closer to N2 than AP1).
Here, we first compute the average wireless hops for a hybrid network. Let dP-{AP} denote the distance from a point P
(Px, Py) to the nearest Access Point. For instance, for the
scenario shown in Figure 3,

0.9

Wireless, α=1

0.8

Wireless, α=3

0.7

Wireless, α=5
Hybrid, α=1

0.6

Hybrid, α=3

0.5

Hybrid, α=5

0.4
0.3
4

5

10

15

20

Average number of Neighbors

Figure 4. Performance comparision: Pure wireless Vs. Hybrid
networks with omnidirectional wireless transmissions.

4. Stealthiness with directional transmissions
We note that using omnidirectional antennas is a poor
choice for networks that desire stealthy communications.
We show that tremendous improvement can be achieved
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by using directional antennas. For instance, consider a directional antenna with an angle of radiation of 100 compared to an omnidirectional antenna whose angle of radiation is 3600. For same transmission range, the area covered
by a transmission in directional case is 36 times lesser than
with omnidirectional case. Thus, there would also be a corresponding improvement in the stealthiness. The rest of the
analysis to compute stealthiness is similar to omnidirectional case presented in previous sections; however, due to
lack of space, we do not present them here.
PERFORMANCE STUDY

(a) Three APs

Next, we generated some random optical configurations.
For each such configuration, we ran multiple simulations.
In each run, the nodes and adversaries are randomly
placed. The average distance between nodes and APs is
computed across all the runs and so are the results (see
Figure 7). The most important observation is that increasing the number of APs does not always improve stealthiness, especially after one stage. We attribute this to the
reason that, no matter how many APs are present, the two
end links are always wireless in any path. We believe that
by using power-controlled steered antennas to control the
transmission range, this limitation could be overcome to
some extent and this would be an interesting aspect to be
studied further.

Number of Stealthy
Connections

In this section, we present some analysis to study the performance of the proposed protocol. We study the most important metric – stealthiness - the probability of a communication message being undetected.

Figure 6 shows the performance in known network topologies of Figure 5. We observed that, the stealthiness can be
improved significantly by using optical links. For instance,
with four APs and 30 adversaries, about 29 connections
were stealthy on an average compared to around 15 without any optical links. Even with just one optical link, up to
6 connections could be secured.

(b) Four APs

Figure 5. Network configurations studied with varying number of APs

50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15

0 APs
2 APs
3 APs
4 APs
1

In all the scenarios, the locations of the APs are fixed as
shown in the configurations. Then, the adversary red zones
are randomly placed in the network area. Then, the nodes
are also randomly placed. Each simulation is repeated 20
times and the average across all the runs is presented. For
all the simulations, 50 source-destination pairs are randomly chosen and connections are established, exploiting the
optical links where possible. A connection is stealthy if
none of adversary nodes is able to overhear the wireless
transmissions in a path for the connection.

30

(a) 500 nodes

Number of Stealthy
Connections

First, we study different topologies. Apart from the topology with two APs as shown in Figure 3, we study two other topologies – with three APs and with 4 APs – as shown
in Figure 5. Later, to understand the performance in random topologies, we study the relation between the stealthiness and the average distance from nodes to the nearest
AP. We consider two network densities: 500 nodes and
200 nodes. We use directional antennas with angle θ=100.

3
5
10
20
Number of adversary nodes

50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10

0 APs
2 APs
3 APs
4 APs
1

3
5
10
20
Number of adversary nodes

30

(b) 200 nodes
Figure 6. Stealthiness in various topologies for directional wireless
transmissions scenario.
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Number of Stealthy
Connections

(a) 500 nodes
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α=5
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2.268 1.944 1.3365 1.025
Avg distance to the nearest AP

0.73

(b) 200 nodes
Figure 7. Stealthiness in unknown topologies as a function of average
distance between nodes and nearest APs; directional transmission scenario

CONCLUSIONS
There is a tremendous need for networks that could perform covert operations, especially in hostile conditions. In
these scenarios, the critical requirement is to be able to
stealthily communicate through wireless channels. In this
paper, we presented a Stealthy Routing Protocol that utilizes a hybrid network consisting of both optical and wireless communication links. As we demonstrated, SRP is
able to significantly improve the stealthiness of communications by using optical links. SRP is able to optimize
wireless communications for the best tradeoffs among,
communication and security. SRP also avoids wireless
propagation that overlaps with red zones, controlled by the
adversary.
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